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Abstract—We describe a lightweight RISC-V ISA extension
for AES and SM4 block ciphers. Sixteen instructions (and a
subkey load) is required to implement an AES round with the
extension, instead of 80 without. An SM4 step (quarter-round)
has 6.5 arithmetic instructions, a similar reduction. Perhaps
even more importantly the ISA extension helps to eliminate
slow, secret-dependent table lookups and to protect against
cache timing side-channel attacks. Having only one S-box, the
extension has a minimal hardware size and is well suited for
ultra-low power applications. AES and SM4 implementations
using the ISA extension also have a much-reduced software
footprint. The AES and SM4 instances can share the same data
paths but are independent in the sense that a chip designer
can implement SM4 without AES and vice versa. Full AES
and SM4 assembler listings, HDL source code for instruction’s
combinatorial logic, and C code for emulation is provided to
the community under a permissive open source license. The
implementation contains depth- and size-optimized joint AES
and SM4 S-Box logic based on the Boyar-Peralta construction
with a shared non-linear middle layer, demonstrating additional
avenues for logic optimization. The instruction logic has been
experimentally integrated into the single-cycle execution path of
the “Pluto” RV32 core and has been tested on an FPGA system.
Index Terms—RISC-V, AES, SM4, Cryptographic ISA Exten-
sion, Lightweight Cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a 128-bit
block cipher with 128/192/256 - bit key, defined in the FIPS
197 standard [9]. AES is a mandatory building block of
the TLS 1.3 [12] security protocol and is widely used for
storage encryption, shared-secret authentication, cryptographic
random number generation, and in many other applications.
The SM4 block cipher [13] fulfills a similar role to AES in
the Chinese market and is the main block cipher recommended
for use in China. It is also standardized with ISO [7]. SM4 also
has a 128-bit block size, but only one key size, 128 bits. Even
though its high-level structure differs completely from AES,
the two share significant similarities in their sole nonlinear
component, which is a single 8 × 8-bit “S-Box” substitution
table in both cases.
Cache timing attacks on AES became well known in mid-
2000s when it was demonstrated that common table-based
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implementations can be exploited even remotely [2], [11]; very
similar issues also affect SM4. In presence of a cache, the
only way to make the execution time of these ciphers fully
independent of secret data is to eliminate the table lookup
either by implementing it as bitsliced Boolean logic or by
providing a specific ISA extension for the S-Box lookup.
Consumer CPUs have had instructions to support AES
for almost a decade via the Intel AES-NI in x86 [6] and
ARMv8-A cryptographic extensions [1]; these are almost
universally available in PCs and higher-end mobile devices
such as phones. ARM also supports SM4 via the ARMv8.2-
SM extension. The AES instructions have been shown to make
AES much less of a throughput bottleneck for high-speed
TLS communication (servers) and storage encryption (mobile
devices), thereby also extending battery life in the latter. Both
Intel and ARM cryptographic ISAs require 128-bit (SIMD)
registers, and are not available on lower-end CPUs.
In this work, we show that it is possible to create a
simple AES and SM4 ISA extension that offers a significant
performance improvement and timing side-channel resistance
with a minimally increased hardware footprint. It is especially
suitable for lightweight RV32 targets.
II. A LIGHTWEIGHT AES AND SM4 ISA EXTENSION
The ISA extension operates on the main register file only,
using two source registers, one destination register, and a 5-
bit field fn[4:0] which can be seen either as an “immediate
constant” or just code points in instruction encoding. In either
case, the interface to the (reference) combinatorial logic is:
module saes32(
output [31:0] rd, // to output register
input [31:0] rs1, // input register 1
input [31:0] rs2, // input register 2
input [4:0] fn // 5-bit func specifier
);
See Section IV-B for encoding details of SAES32 as an RV32
R-type custom instruction for testing purposes. For RV64 the
words are simply truncated or zero-extended.
The five bits of fn cover encryption, decryption, and key
schedule for both algorithms. Bits fn[1:0] first select a
single byte from rs2. Two bits fn[4:3] indicate which
8 → 8 - bit S-Box is used (AES, AES−1, or SM4), and
additionally fn[4:2] specifies a 8→ 32 - bit linear expan-
sion transformation (each of three S-Boxes has two alternative
linear transforms, indicated by fn[2]). The expanded 32-bit
TABLE I
HIGH-LEVEL ASSEMBLER IDENTIFIERS FOR FN[4:2].
Instruction fn[4:2] Description or Use
saes32.encsm 3’b000 AES Encrypt round.
saes32.encs 3’b001 AES Final / Key sched.
saes32.decsm 3’b010 AES Decrypt round.
saes32.decs 3’b011 AES Decrypt final.
ssm4.ed 3’b100 SM4 Encrypt and Decrypt.
ssm4.ks 3’b101 SM4 Key Schedule.
Unused 3’b11x (4× 6 = 24 points used.)
value is then rotated by 0–3 byte positions based on fn[1:0].
The result is finally XORed with rs1 and written to rd.
Table I contains the identifiers (pseudo instructions) that
we currently use for bits fn[4:2]. Usually we may arrange
computation so that rd = rs1 without increasing instruction
count, making a two-operand “compressed” encoding possible.
For AES the instruction selects a byte from rs2, performs
a single S-box lookup (SubBytes or its inverse), evaluates a
part of the MDS matrix (MixColumns) if that linear expansion
is step selected, rotates the result by a multiple of 8 bits
(ShiftRows), and XORs the result with rs1 (AddRoundKey).
There is no need for separate instructions for individual steps
of AES as small parts of each of them have been incorporated
into a single instruction. We’ve found that each one of these
substeps requires surprisingly little additional logic.
For SM4 the instruction has the same data path with byte
selection, S-Box lookup, and two different linear operations,
depending on whether encryption/decryption or key scheduling
task is being performed.
Both AES [9] and SM4 [13] specifications are written using
big-endian notation while RISC-V uses primarily little-endian
convention [15]. To avoid endianness conversion the linear
expansion step outputs have a flipped byte order. This is less
noticeable with AES, but the 32-bit word rotations of SM4
become less intuitive to describe (while wiring is equivalent).
We refer to the concise reference implementation discussed
in Section IV for details about specific logic operations re-
quired to implement the ISA extension, and for standards-
derived unit tests.
III. USING THE AES AND SM4 INSTRUCTIONS
AES and SM4 were originally designed primarily for 32-
bit software implementation. SAES32/SSM4 adopts the “in-
tended” 32-bit implementation structure but removes table
lookups and rolls several individual steps into the same instruc-
tion. Both AES and SM4 implementations are also realizable
with the reduced “E” register file without major changes.
A. AES Computation and Key Schedule
The structure of an AES implementation is similar to
a “T-Table” implementation, with sixteen invocations of
saes32.encsm per round and not much else (apart from
fetching the round subkeys). In practice, two sets of four
registers are used to store the state, with one set being
used to rewrite the other, depending on whether an odd
or even-numbered round is being processed. AES has r ∈
{10, 12, 14} rounds, depending on the key size which can be
{128, 192, 256}, respectively. The final round requires sixteen
invocations of saes32.encs. The same instructions are also
used in the key schedule which expands the secret key to 4r+4
subkey words.
The inverse AES operation is structured similarly,
with 16 saes32.decsm per main body round and 16
saes32.decs for the final round. These instructions are
also used for reversing the key schedule. Four precomputed
subkey words must be fetched in each round, requiring four
loads (lw instructions) in addition to their address increment
(typically every other round). There is no need for separate
AddRoundKey XORs as the subkeys simply initialize either
one of the four-register sets used to store the state.
It is also possible to compute the round keys “on the
fly” without committing them to RAM. This may be helpful
in certain types of security applications. The overhead is
roughly 30%. However, if the load operation is much slower
than register-to-register arithmetic, the overhead of on-the-fly
subkey computation can become negligible. On-the-fly keying
is more challenging in reverse.
B. SM4 Computation and Key Schedule
SM4 has only one key size, 128 bits. The algorithm has 32
steps, each using a single 32-bit subkey word. The steps are
typically organized into 8 full rounds of 4 steps each. Due to its
Feistel-like structure SM4 does not require an inverse S-Box
for decryption like AES, which is a substitution-permutation
network (SPN). The inverse SM4 cipher is equivalent to the
forward cipher, but with a reversed subkey order.
Each step uses all four state words and one subkey word
as inputs, replacing a single state word. Since input mixing
is built from XORs, some of the temporary XOR values are
unchanged and can be shared between steps. Each round re-
quires ten XORs in addition to sixteen ssm4.ed invocations,
bringing the total number of arithmetic instructions to 26 per
round – or 6.5 per step. Therefore SM4 performance is slightly
lower than that of AES-128, despite having fewer full rounds.
The key schedule similarly requires 16 invocations of
ssm4.ks and 10 XORs to produce a block of four subkey
words. The key schedule uses 32 “CK” round constants which
can be either fetched from a table or computed with 8-bit
addition operations on the fly.
For SM4 each block of four consecutive invocations of
ssm4.ed and ssm4.ks share the same source and des-
tination registers, differing only in fn[1:0] which steps
through {0, 1, 2, 3}. We denote such a four-SAES32 block as
pseudo instruction ssm4.ed4. One can reduce the per-round
instruction count of SM4 from 26 (+4 lw) to 14 (+4 lw) by
implementing ssm4.ed4 as a “real” instruction that is almost
four times larger than SAES32 in hardware.
Note that without additional instructions an AES imple-
mentation does not benefit from four parallel S-Boxes in
encryption or decryption, only in key schedule.
TABLE II
ALGEBRAIC GATE COUNTS FOR A BOYAR-PERALTA TYPE LOW-DEPTH
S-BOXES THAT IMPLEMENT SM4 IN ADDITION TO AES AND AES−1.
Component In, Out XOR XNOR AND Total
Shared middle 21 → 18 30 - 34 64
AES top 8 → 21 26 - - 26
AES bottom 18 → 8 34 4 - 38
AES−1 top 8 → 21 16 10 - 26
AES−1 bottom 18 → 8 37 - - 37
SM4 top 8 → 21 18 9 - 27
SM4 bottom 18 → 8 33 5 - 38
IV. REFERENCE IMPLEMENTATION
An open-source reference implementation is available1. The
distribution contains HDL combinatorial logic for the SAES32
instruction (including the S-Boxes) and provisional assembler
listings for full AES-128/192/256 and SM4-128.
The package also has C-language emulator code for the
instruction logic, “runnable pseudocode” implementations of
algorithms, and a set of standards-derived unit tests. This
research distribution is primarily intended for obtaining data
such as instruction counts and intermediate values but can be
readily integrated into many RISC-V cores and emulators.
A. About the AES, SM4 S-Boxes
AES and SM4 can share data paths so it makes sense to
explore their additional structural similarities and differences.
Both SM4 and AES S-Boxes are constructed from finite
field inversion x−1 in GF(28) together with a linear (affine)
transformations on input and/or output. The inversion makes
them “Nyberg S-Boxes” [10] with desirable properties against
differential and linear cryptanalysis, while the linear mixing
steps are intended to break the bytewise algebraic structure.
Since x−1 is an involution (self-inverse) and affine isomor-
phic regardless of polynomial basis, AES, AES−1, and SM4
S-Boxes really differ only in their inner and outer linear layers.
Boyar and Peralta [4] show how to build low-depth circuits
for AES that are composed of a linear top and bottom layers
and a shared nonlinear middle stage. Here XOR and XNOR
gates are “linear” and the shared nonlinear layer consists
of XOR and AND gates only. For this project we created
additional top and bottom layers for SM4 that use the same
the middle layer as AES and AES−1.
Each S-Box expands an 8-bit input to 21 bits in a linear
inner (“top”) layer, uses the shared nonlinear 21-to-18 bit
mapping as a middle layer, and again compresses 18 bits to 8
bits in the outer (“bottom”) layer. Table II gives the individual
gate counts to each layer; summing up top, middle, and bottom
gives the total S-Box gate count (≈ 128).
Despite such a strict structure and limited choice of gates
(that is suboptimal for silicon but very natural to mathematics),
these are some of the smallest circuits for AES known. Note
that it is possible to implement AES with fewer gates (113
total), but this results in 50% higher circuit depth [3].
1AES/SM4 ISA Extension: https://github.com/mjosaarinen/lwaes isa
TABLE III
RV32 SOC AREA WITH AND WITHOUT SAES32 (AES, AES−1, SM4);
“PLUTO” CORE ON AN ARTIX-7 FPGA. EXTAES IS A CPU-EXTERNAL
MEMORY-MAPPEDAES-ONLY MODULE, PRESENTED FOR COMPARISON.
Resource Base SAES32 (∆) EXTAES (∆)
Logic LUTs 7,767 8,202 (+435) 9,795 (+2,028
Slice regs 3,319 3,342 (+23) 4,361 (+1,042)
SLICEL 1,571 1,864 (+293) 2,068 (+497)
SLICEM 734 737 (+3) 851 (+117)
TABLE IV
YOSYS SIMPLE CMOS FLOW AREA ESTIMATES FOR SAES32.
Target GE (NAND2) Transistors LTP
AES Encrypt only 642 2,568 25
SM4 Full 767 3,066 25
AES Full 1,240 4,960 28
AES + SM4 Full 1,679 6,714 28
B. Experimental Instruction Encoding and Synthesis
For prototyping we interfaced the SAES32 logic using
the custom-0 opcode and R-type instruction encoding with
fn[4:0] occupying lower 5 bits of the funct7 field:
[31:30] [29:25] [24:20] [19:15] [14:12] [11:7] [6:0]
00 fn rs2 rs1 000 rd 0001011
The implementation has been tested with PQShield’s
“Pluto” RISC-V core. We synthesized the same core on low-
end Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA target (XC7A35TICSG324-1L) with
and without the SAES32 (AES, SM4) instruction extension
and related execution pipeline interface. Table III summarizes
the relative area added by SAES32. For comparison, we
also measured the size of a memory-mapped AES module
“EXTAES”. This module implements AES encryption only.
Based on our FPGA experiments we estimate that the full
(AES, AES−1, SM4) instruction proposal increases the amount
of core logic (LUTs) by about 5% over a typical baseline
RV32I core, but relatively much less for more complex cores.
Table IV contains area estimates for the SAES32 module
(not the additional decoding logic) using the Yosys “Simple
CMOS” flow which uses a mock-up ASIC cell library. Here
GE is the gate count (NAND2 Equivalents) and Longest
Topological Path (LTP) is the reported depth (delay) measure.
Implementors can experiment if it is beneficial to multiplex
the S-Box linear layers with the shared middle layer. The
required mux logic seems large and increases the circuit depth,
so our current reference implementation does not use it.
V. PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
The hand-optimized AES implementation2 referenced in
[14] requires 80 core arithmetic instructions per round. The
same task can be accomplished with 16 SAES32 instructions.
Furthermore, 16 of those 80 are memory loads, which typi-
cally require more cycles than a simple arithmetic instruction
(or SAES32). Each AES round additionally requires a few
operations for loading subkeys and managing instruction flow.
2Ko Stoffelen: “RISC-V Crypto” [14] https://github.com/Ko-/riscvcrypto
Overall, based on RV32 and RV64 instruction counts we
estimate that the performance of an SAES32 AES can be
expected to be more than 500% better than the fastest AES
implementations that use the baseline ISA only. Much of the
precise performance gain over a table-based implementation
depends on the latency of memory load operations.
SAES32-based AES and SM4 implementations are inher-
ently constant-time and resistant to timing attacks. Stoffelen
[14] also presents a constant-time, bitsliced AES implementa-
tion for RISC-V which requires 2.5 times more cycles than the
optimized table-based implementation. So SAES32 speedup
over a timing side-channel hardened base ISA implementation
is expected to be roughly 15-fold.
We are not aware of any definitive assembler benchmarks
for SM4 on RISC-V, but based on instruction count estimates
the performance improvement can be expected to be roughly
similar or more (over 500 %). Without SAES32 simple
SM4 software implementations would benefit from rotation
instructions which have been proposed in the RISC-V bit
manipulation extension, but are not widely available.
We have only discussed timing side-channel attacks. Since
these instructions interact with the main register file, any
electromagnetic emission countermeasures would probably
have to be extended to additional parts of the CPU core.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a minimalistic RISC-V ISA extension for AES
and SM4 block ciphers. The resulting speedup is 500% or
more for both ciphers when compared to hand-optimized base
ISA assembler implementations that use lookup tables.
In addition to saving energy and reducing latency in secure
communications and storage encryption, the main security
benefit of the instructions is their constant-time operation and
resulting resistance against cache timing attacks. Such coun-
termeasures are expensive in pure software implementations.
The instructions require logic only for a single S-Box,
which is combined with additional linear layers for increased
code density and performance. The hardware footprint of the
instruction is very small as a result. If both AES and SM4
are implemented on the same target they can share data paths
which further simplifies hardware. However, AES and SM4 are
independent of each other and AES−1 is also optional. It is not
rare to implement and use the forward AES without inverse
AES as common CTR-based AES modes (such as GCM) do
not require the inverse cipher for decryption [5].
This proposal is targeted towards (ultra) lightweight MCUs
and SoCs. A different type of ISA extension may provide
additional speedups on 64-bit and vectorized platforms, but
with the cost of increased implementation area. Designers may
still want to choose this minimal-footprint option if timing
side-channel resistance is their primary concern.
Postscript. Since the original submission and preprint dis-
tribution of this work in February 2020, these “Scalar 32-
bit” instructions have been adopted to the RISC-V Crypto
Extension Proposal [8]. We’ve changed the instruction names
to reflect that specification; thanks to Ben Marshall et al.
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